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Abstract
Recently, immigration and its socio-economic aspects have been in the centre of the European Union leaders’ agenda.
In this paper, we apply the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) methodology to calculate the complete set of NTA results
for immigrants and natives in ﬁve EU countries. We ﬁnd that due to the lower labour income, which cannot be offset by
the lower consumption, immigrants experience a shorter independence period and a much lower aggregate life cycle
surplus than natives. The identiﬁed cross country differences between immigrants and natives could be used as a proxy
of the achieved level of integration of immigrants.
Keywords: National transfer accounts, Immigrants, EU countries, Economic independence, Life cycle deﬁcit ﬁnancing
JEL classiﬁcation: J15, J18, D64

Introduction

I

n recent years, immigration and the socio-economic aspects of migration have become a central
topic of the European Union (EU). Although lately
the emphasis is placed on the possible new wave of
refugees, immigration in EU has been a continuous
process since World War II (de la Rica et al., 2015).
The economic circumstances were changing during
that period which caused alterations in the dynamics and substance of immigrants’ ﬂows. There
are at least four different phases that can be identiﬁed here: (i) migration as a result of post-war
adjustment and decolonisation, (ii) labour migration
between 1960 and 1973, when the rapid economic
growth created huge demand for workers, (iii)
restrained migration due to deep recession
following the oil shock, and (iv) migration due to
dissolution of socialism and later on, in times of
asylum seekers, refugees and illegal immigration.
Further, two processes can be identiﬁed: the ﬁrst
process involves Eastern Europeans with more
freedom to travel starting to enter Western Europe,

and the other process is the continuous ﬂow of
people from different places in the world affected by
war conﬂicts (Stalker, 2002). This last phase still
explains the migration processes in the last decade,
in addition to the effect of the EU enlargement by 10
Central and Eastern European countries in 2004,
and Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia in the later
years. Since EU has been obliged to ensure free
movement of people among the member countries,
the ﬂow from east to west remains important along
with other free movements across EU countries.
In 2015, Europe as a continent counted for around
75 million migrants or 31 per cent of the total international migrant stock. There are some similarities across countries in terms of the economic,
social and cultural effects of migrants on the domestic population, but there are also many differences and complexities which raise various
questions and challenges for national policy makers
(International Organization for Migration, 2017).
The EU countries might perceive immigration as
an opportunity to mitigate the negative impact of
the ageing population on the labour market and the
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sustainability of public ﬁnances. It is assumed that
selective immigration of young, educated, skilled
individuals, ﬁlling shortage occupations is beneﬁcial
for the economic “well-being” of the immigrant
receiving countries (Zimmermann, 2005). However,
is it possible to establish immigration policies for
attracting the desired immigrants? More importantly, do immigrants with the desired characteristics achieve the expected market labour outcomes?
In the past, there have been numerous studies
investigating the labour gap and the reasons for
immigrants' limited employment success and their
wage differences compared to natives. The main
goal of this paper is to use the novel data on immigrants from the National Transfer Accounts
(NTA) in order to examine not only the labour gap
but also differences in consumption and the economic behaviour of immigrants in general. Thus,
our study aims to conﬁrm the previous literature
conclusions for lower labour income of immigrants
than natives, and in addition to identify the lower
level of the immigrants’ consumption which might
be an adjustment mechanism for preserving their
economic independence. Furthermore, NTA results
provide data to analyse how immigrants and natives
ﬁnance the gap between the consumption and labour income, i.e. to what extent they rely on public
transfers which is an important aspect in terms of
the ongoing population ageing process.
For assessing the economic impact of immigration, we analyse the production and consumption
patterns over the life cycle. We use the concept of
life cycle deﬁcit as deﬁned by the NTA methodology
(Lee & Masson, 2011). By allocating all categories of
income and consumption by age, we identify the
age period of economic independence, i.e. a ‘life
cycle surplus’ as well as the age periods of economic
dependency for the young and the elderly in which
labour income falls short of consumption for both
immigrants and natives. The NTA shows how the
excess consumption of individuals over their own
labour income, also called a ‘life cycle deﬁcit’, is
ﬁnanced through the public transfers (e.g. public
education, health, long-term care), private transfers
(e.g. parents ﬁnancing food, clothing, housing etc. of
their children) and interaction with the capital and
ﬁnancial markets (e.g. dividends received, loans
taken).
In this paper, we examine the difference between
the life cycle surplus of immigrants and natives by
comparing their age span of the economic independency period and the size of their economic independence. Furthermore, we examine how the
difference between age-speciﬁc consumption and
age-speciﬁc labour income (i.e. life cycle deﬁcit) is
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ﬁnanced for the immigrants versus natives in the
old age.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we
analyse the differences between immigrants and
natives in economic ﬂows by age. Second, we provide a cross-country comparison. The cross-country
differences between immigrants and natives could
also be used as a proxy of the achieved level of
integration of immigrants in the analysed countries.
We provide the results for ﬁve European countries
that have all the required data available: Belgium,
Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland and Sweden. The diversity
among these countries enables us to shed some light
on the potential factors of the differences.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a literature review on the differences
in labour income and consumption over the life
cycle, as well as the differences in ﬁnancing the life
cycle deﬁcit between immigrants and natives. Section 2 presents the NTA methodology and how the
economic ﬂows of natives and immigrants are
calculated. Section 3 presents the stylized facts for
immigrants in the analysed countries and the NTA
results by the immigration status across countries.
The last section concludes the article.

1 Background
1.1 Immigrants' versus natives’ labour income
Age is the central economic characteristic of individuals that determines their ability to produce
and their consumption needs. The labour income
estimated by the NTA approach shows the average
market value of labour income in each age group. It
reﬂects the variation in employment rates, hours
worked and hourly wages across age. Thus, the
difference in labour income between immigrants
and natives reveals different labour force participation and unemployment rates (deﬁning the
employment rates as the difference between these
two) and different labour income composed of gross
wages, self-employment labour income, social
contribution and fringe beneﬁts at a speciﬁc age
(Lee & Ogawa, 2011).
The differences in labour force participation rates
of immigrants and natives are mainly driven by the
difﬁculties in the labour market integration of immigrants. Employment rates of immigrants are
lower than of natives, whereas the unemployment
rates are higher (OECD, 2016). There is a vast body
of literature trying to identify the determinants of
the weak labour integration (Adsera & Chiswick,
2007; de la Rica et al., 2015; Kogan, 2004; Uhlendorff
& Zimmermann, 2014), classifying them into the
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micro and macroeconomic levels. At the micro level,
the most important predictors of lower access to
jobs and lower level of wages are individuals'
characteristics, i.e. human capital. At the macro
level, the strongest impact on the employability of
immigrants are the immigrants’ destination country
and the country of origin (Fleischmann & Dronkers,
2010).
The main determinants related to human capital
are education, experience, training, language proﬁciency and the immigrants' age. The level of education, type and years of experience as well as
obtained training are important determinants but
more in the context of how much they are valued in
the destination country (Clark & Drinkwater, 2008;
Zimmermann, 2005). Friedberg (2000) argues that
human capital is imperfectly portable across countries. She ﬁnds that the education of immigrants
coming from countries with a more similar educational system and economy is more valued. In such
cases, the employment opportunities for immigrants
and the return to education are more similar to
natives. Likewise, the experience obtained abroad is
often differently valued in both earnings and the
employment probability (Blackaby et al., 2002; Kee,
1995). In line with these ﬁndings, over-qualiﬁcation
of immigrants coming from the EU10 countries, who
have occupied low skill jobs in the UK, Ireland and
other EU countries (Barrett et al., 2006; Drinkwater
et al., 2009; OECD, 2007) is also observed. Nevertheless, Uhlendorff and Zimmermann (2014) ﬁnd
some evidence that high skilled immigrants have a
higher probability of leaving unemployment than
low skilled immigrants.
Immigrants’ knowledge and proﬁciency of the
destination country language is stated as the key
determinant of the success of immigrants in the labour market. Clark and Drinkwater (2008) argue
that this is reasonable as communication skills have
become even more important in the modern service
and knowledge-based economies. Peri and Sparber
(2011) perceive the lack of language proﬁciency as
different skill endowments of immigrants and natives, where natives are comparatively stronger in
communication skills intensive jobs, while immigrants are superior in manual skills intensive jobs
leading to lower wages. Consequently, immigrants
tend to prevail in certain occupations and industries.
This occupational segregation renders immigrant
labour outcomes vulnerable to the industry performance and development (Ottaviano & Peri, 2012).
The skill differences seem to point out the possible
difference in productivity, which is a key economic
factor for the differences in wages. However, the
study conducted on a ﬁrm level and controlled for

productivity effects reveals that differences remain
even after controlling for productivity. Hence, it
suggests that there is a wage discrimination against
immigrants (Kampelmann & Rycx, 2016).
The age at arrival is reported by Schaafsma and
Sweetman (2001) as a factor that is negatively
related to the immigrants’ earnings. The explanations relate both to the human capital and language
proﬁciency: the older the immigrants are at the time
of entry, the less likely it is for them to obtain education in the destination country, and their ability to
master the language diminishes.
Besides the human capital characteristics, we
argue that there are three dominant factors that
affect the immigrants’ success in the labour market:
(1) country of origin, (2) reasons for immigration and
(3) duration of stay in the country.
First, both statistical data and studies (OECD,
2014; OECD, 2016) show that the country of origin is
important for the employability of immigrants
(Adsera & Chiswick, 2007). While high-skilled immigrants from developed countries experience
similar (un)employment rates to natives, that is not
the case for the rest of immigrants (Kogan, 2004).
The difference in the level of development of the
country of origin and the destination country is the
main reason for the variation in the level of wages.
When both countries are at the same level of
development, immigrants face similar level of
employment and wages compared to natives
(Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010; Kogan, 2004).
Second, Scarpa (2016) is one of those who has
investigated how the reason for immigration affects
the labour outcomes. His study reveals that the
immigrants in Genoa (Italy) and Malm€
o (Sweden)
originated from less developed countries, but
differed in their type of entry and reasons for
immigration. Immigrants in Genoa, often coming
illegally but with clear work objective, turned out to
be much more labour involved, as their skills corresponded to the skill shortage in this city. In
contrast, immigrants in Malm€
o arrived legally on
the basis of family reuniﬁcation, humanitarian and
other reasons, but could not respond to the labour
market demand and achieved poor labour outcomes. The reason for immigration (the broadest
classiﬁcation being: economic, family integration or
asylum reasons) refers to the type of entry, which is
presumably available from residence permit registers. This information is easy for monitoring immigrants (in)ﬂows, but not reliable nor useful for
monitoring and analysing of immigrant stocks and
as such hinders this kind of research. Another
source that studies use in order to assess the
importance of the entry category is the survey data
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(the most important being the special module of the
Eurostat employment Survey in 2008), but often
these data differ from the data in residence permit
registers (OECD, 2012b).
Third, the difference in the (un)employment rates
and wages tends to decrease with the longer stay of
immigrants in the country. Recent immigrants,
deﬁned as those who have arrived within the last 5
years, have lower employment rates and higher
unemployment rates than settled immigrants and
these differences are additionally higher when
compared to natives (OECD, 2016). The study that
compared immigrants' and natives’ earnings in 15
European countries revealed that the immigrantnative earnings gap narrows with longer stay in the
destination country and that it disappears after
about 18 years (Adsera & Chiswick, 2007).
1.2 Immigrants' versus natives’ consumption
In contrast to the vast literature on labour market
outcomes, the consumption behaviour of immigrants seems to be under-researched. Ballester et al.
(2015) identify lower consumption levels in Spain of
the households whose household head is immigrant. The difference is more pronounced in times
of crisis when those households' consumption reduces more than the consumption of households
where the household head is a native. Two studies
based on Italian data ﬁnd a difference between the
consumption levels of natives and immigrants, and
of legal and illegal immigrants (Barigozzi & Speciale, 2011; Dustmann et al., 2017). They show that
the consumption level of legal immigrants and natives is different, but tend to slowly converge with
the immigrants’ longer stay. On the other hand,
illegal immigrants consume 40% less than legal
immigrants, conditional on their background characteristics. Only one quarter of this consumption
gap is explained by lower incomes of illegal immigrants compared to legal immigrants.
Finally, while labour gap has been widely investigated and the consumption behaviour of immigrants
has been in the focus of few studies, it seems that no
attention has been devoted to the difference between
labour income and consumption, deﬁning economic
(in)dependency of immigrants versus natives. Here
we see a theoretical and empirical gap and try to
shed some light on this highly relevant topic.
1.3 Financing the life cycle deﬁcit in the old age of
immigrants versus natives
Changes in the demographic and economic life
cycle pertinent for modern societies (as opposed to
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hunter-gathers societies) have led to the phenomenon
of old age dependency (Lee, 2000). The longevity of
people and low fertility that resulted in population
ageing further emphasized the importance of the way
the old-age dependency (life cycle deﬁcit) is ﬁnanced.
Immigrant population is also ageing in many European countries (Baykara-Krumme, 2008; Lanzieri,
2011; Van Mol & de Valk, 2016) and the number of old
immigrants is expected to rise further (Schimany et al.,
2013). Thus, it is important for the destination countries to be informed not only about the level of the
immigrants’ economic dependence during the working age period, but also about the extent to which old
immigrants rely on (intergenerational) public and
private transfers. Intergenerational transfers burden
working age, young and future generations, as
opposed to the reliance on their own previously
accumulated assets.
Public transfers to and from immigrants have
been extensively elaborated in the literature, aiming
to assess the overall impact of immigrants on public
ﬁnances (Auerbach & Oreopoulos, 2000; Lee &
Miller, 2000; B€
oheim & Mayr, 2005; Chojnicki, 2013;
Preston, 2014). Based on the most relevant studies
for Europe and USA, it seems that there is no signiﬁcant impact of immigrants on the public ﬁnances
ranging to max þ- 1% of GDP, and that the policies
shall be based on other possible immigration implications (Rowthorn, 2008). With regard to private
transfers, their level primarily depends on the generosity of the public systems and the welfare state
provisions and to a lesser extent to family norms, so
only limited differences in support between immigrants and natives have been identiﬁed (Bordone &
de Volk, 2016). Private transfers are strongly
downward (parent-child) in every economy out of
23 countries for which NTA results have been
calculated in Lee and Masson (2011) and not an
important source for ﬁnancing old age dependency.
However, upward private transfers are found in
families with high poverty or where elderly have no
access to adequate pension, which is sometimes the
case of ﬁrst-generation immigrants from developing
countries (Attias-Donfut & Wolff, 2008; BaykaraKrumme, 2008). Saraceno (2010) found that more
time for care and support is provided to individuals
with low socio-economic status and by their children with low income. With regard to asset accumulation and transfers for old age, Escriva (2013)
based on Peruvian and Moroccan immigrants in
Spain concludes that middle-aged immigrants have
limited possibilities to save and invest, due to the
high unemployment rates and low wages, as well as
due to spending a lot of resources on their old
parents.
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2 Data and methodology
2.1 NTA methodology
In our analysis, the immigrant is deﬁned as a
person whose country of birth is different from the
country of usual residence (in which the respondent
was surveyed). Given the nature of the surveys, only
legal immigrants are expected to be included. This
seemingly clear deﬁnition might be challenged, if
country borders have changed in the past e for
example, the Estonian-Russian national border.
Namely, people born in a place which is at the time
of the survey outside the national territory but feel
that they are national citizens, their country of birth
is entered according to this citizenship (Eurostat,
2011). We need to have this in mind when interpreting the results, since some country differences
might be originating from this fact.
In order to examine the difference between the life
cycle deﬁcit of immigrants and natives, we use the
relatively new NTA methodology and for the ﬁrst
time decomposed NTA results by immigration status. The main motivation for introducing the National Transfer Accounts was a better understanding
of the generational economy and the economic
ﬂows across age groups. The NTA are consistent
with the System of National Accounts (SNA) and
complement them by introducing the age dimension. The NTA results have been already calculated
for more than 70 countries across the globe and
provide invaluable, consistent and comparable
input for academic research but also for social and
economic policies (http://www.ntaccounts.org/).
Age is a fundamental characteristic of individuals
in deﬁning their economic behaviour. In general,
three phases in the course of life can be identiﬁed: 1)
young age when individuals consume more than
they produce and have to rely on the resources from
others, 2) working-age when the production exceeds
consumption and the resources are left for (co-)
ﬁnancing the consumption in the other two phases,
and 3) old age when labour income again falls short
of consumption (Lee, 2000). This pattern is general
across all countries, but there are important differences in ages at which individuals are economically
(in)dependent, in the size of economic (in)dependence and how the periods of dependence are
ﬁnanced. The NTA key concept e the life cycle
deﬁcit e is deﬁned as the age-speciﬁc difference
between consumption and labour income and enables us to measure the individuals’ economic
dependency.
The gap between consumption and labour income
can be ﬁnanced through private transfers (for

example parents ﬁnancing their children's consumption), public transfers (publicly ﬁnanced pensions, education, health etc.) or asset-based
reallocations that result from participation on capital
and ﬁnancial markets. This relation is presented with
the following ﬂow identity (Lee & Masson, 2011):

Cx  YLx ¼ tþ
x  tx þ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
|ﬄﬄﬄ
ﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}

Lifecycle deficit

Net transfers

YAx  Sx
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}

;

ð1Þ

Assetbased reallocations

where Cx denotes consumption; YLx labour income;

tþ
x transfers received; tx transfers given; YAx asset
income; and Sx savings. The general approach of the
NTA is to combine survey data and various other
data sources to create a relative position of the NTA
categories for each age group and then by adjusting
those relative ‘age proﬁles’ (using the population by
age) to meet the aggregate controls from SNA orein
the case of the EU countries e the European System
of Accounts (ESA). Next, the main categories of the
ﬂow identity shown in Equation (1) are elaborated.
The NTA methodology is presented in the United
Nations (2013) manual. For speciﬁcs of the European
NTA see also Istenic et al. (2017).
2.1.1 Labour income
Labour income as deﬁned by the NTA represents
the workers' compensation in its broadest sense,
including gross wages, employer's contribution and
fringe beneﬁts. The labour income consists of
earnings of employees and the labour income of
self-employed. Earnings include wages and salaries
and the employer's social contributions, domestic
and those from the rest of the world. The main
category of earnings are gross wages. Additionally,
earnings include all the payments that a worker
receives as the result of his/her labour input, like
holiday leave payment, compensation for food and
transportation or any other payment provided by
the organisation in which he/she works, as well as
non-cash employee income (e.g. private use of a
company car). Earnings of employees represent the
largest part of total labour income, while labour
income of the self-employed is a much smaller
component.
In our case, the data refer to 1-year age groups.
The labour income age proﬁle is calculated as a
weighted average of income components from the
EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EUSILC) survey. This survey also contains data on cash
beneﬁts or losses from self-employment on the individual level. The obtained relative age proﬁle is
adjusted to the ESA aggregates of mixed income.
Because the ESA aggregates of mixed income
include both return on labour (i.e. self-employment
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income) and the return on capital of household
enterprises, the NTA uses a simple assumption of
allocating two-thirds of mixed income to labour income and one-third to the capital income (based on
empirical evidence, e.g. Gollin, 2002).
2.1.2 Consumption
Consumption consists of private and public consumption. In the NTA framework, private and
public consumption are both decomposed to education, health and other private or public consumption. This distinction is motivated by the
strong age patterns of the education and health
expenditures.
Data on private consumption are obtained from
the Household Budget Survey (HBS) for 2010 that
Eurostat made available in 2016 for most EU countries. Since private consumption is reported on the
household level, various methods are used to allocate household expenditures to individual household members. For allocating the private
expenditures on health by age, a linear regression
model (without a constant term) is applied. By using
the regression method, the total household expenditures are regressed on the number of household
members in each age group. The relative size of
regression coefﬁcients (representing weights for
individuals of different ages) is used to allocate
household expenditures to individual members
within each individual household. In the case of
private education expenditures, we distribute
household expenditures for a speciﬁc level of education equally among the household members
enrolled in that particular level of education. Other
consumption (excluding health and education) is
allocated by applying the modiﬁed Deaton's (1997)
equivalence scale. The NTA approach assumes the
equivalence scale of 0.4 for children age four or
younger, a linear increase from 0.4 to one between
age four and age 20, and one for adults aged 20 or
older.
Data for public consumption are mainly based on
administrative data. To allocate public expenditures
on education by age, we split ﬁnal public consumption on education between different levels of
education. Within each level of education, we use
age- and level-speciﬁc enrolment rates to calculate
relative per capita expenditures. We assume that
within each level of education, the expenditures per
enrolled student are the same regardless of the
student's age.
Public health consumption allocated by age is
taken from the Ageing Working Group (AWG)
(2012). AWG uses the age distribution of health for
the long-term projections of public expenditures.
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The ‘other public consumption’ category consists of
collective consumption such as government expenditures on defence, police, administration, building
and repairing public roads, etc., and individual
consumption such as in-kind social beneﬁts for
disability and sickness, old age, unemployment,
family and children, etc. In the case of collective
consumption, it is assumed that all individuals are
beneﬁciaries; therefore, the uniform distribution of
expenditures across age is used. For individual
‘other’ consumption, the public expenditures are
allocated to the beneﬁciaries of particular public
programmes, mainly by using the information on
cash transfers reported in the EU-SILC.
2.1.3 Transfers
As presented in Equation (1), the age reallocations
through which the gap between consumption and
labour income is ﬁnanced consist of two comprehensive, mutually exclusive ﬂows e transfers and
asset-based reallocations. In the NTA, transfers are
deﬁned as in-kind and in-cash transfers between
the private sector and the public sector, as well as
between different private institutions. While the
public sector is deﬁned as general government, the
private sector consists of households, non-proﬁt
institutions serving households, and proﬁt and nonproﬁt corporations. Some of these ﬂows can be
directly estimated from the SNA/ESA. Some require
modiﬁcation and others (such as intra-household
transfers) have no SNA/ESA counterpart.
Net public transfers are the difference between
public transfer inﬂows and public transfer outﬂows.
Public transfer inﬂows refer to the ﬂows that are
mediated by the government, including both inkind and in-cash transfers received by individuals.
Public transfers in-kind are public education, public
health care and defence to name few, while public
transfers in-cash are public pensions, unemployment beneﬁts, family and child allowances, etc.
Public inﬂows are assigned to the individuals who
are their beneﬁciaries. While in-kind public transfer
inﬂows are equal to the public consumption, public
transfers in-cash are estimated using the EU-SILC
data where individuals report how much money
they have received in transfers. On the other hand,
public outﬂows are economic ﬂows from private to
public sector, mainly consisting of different kinds of
taxes and social contributions that individuals pay to
the government or local authorities.
Private transfers include transfers between
different households (inter-household transfers) and
transfers within the same household (intra-household transfers). One of the main contributions of the
NTA methodology is its comprehensive measuring
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of intra-household transfers. This was not possible
earlier, since transfers within households are not
reported in SNA. Even though at the aggregate level
intra-household transfers are equal to zero, they
represent a very important category of the intergenerational transfers. While the inter-household
transfers age proﬁles are estimated directly using
EU-SILC, the intra-household transfers are indirectly
estimated as a balancing item between private consumption and disposable income, where disposable
income includes labour income, cash transfers less
taxes paid and net inter-household transfers.
Household members whose disposable income falls
short of consumption are in deﬁcit and therefore
receive transfers from other household members
with a surplus. If the total household deﬁcit is larger
than the total household surplus, the household head
makes transfers out of asset income, i.e. he/she dissaves (Lee & Masson, 2011).
2.1.4 Asset-based reallocations
The asset-based reallocations consist of private
and public reallocations, whereby private reallocations are more important. Asset-based reallocations
consist of 1) asset income, including capital income
and property income and 2) savings, whereas the
asset income is an inﬂow and saving (if positive) is
an outﬂow (Lee & Masson, 2011). Private capital
income consists of capital income of corporations,
income from owner occupied housing, and unincorporated enterprise income (i.e. capital share of
mixed income). Private property income consists of
ﬂows generated by ﬁnancial assets such as interests,
dividends and rents. Assets (reported only at the
household level) are assumed to be owned by the
household head.
2.2 NTA for immigrants and natives
Estimating age proﬁles from the survey data (e.g.
labour and asset income, private consumption, incash public transfer inﬂows), separately for immigrants and natives, is straightforward, i.e. we
calculate immigration status-speciﬁc averages,
instead of the total age-speciﬁc averages. In both
micro-level datasets, EU-SILC and HBS, we deﬁne
immigrants as all those household members whose
country of birth is different from the country of
residence. Since in EU-SILC individuals report the
year of immigration, all those with a missing value
at the variable country of birth are also treated as
immigrants if they have reported the year of
immigration.
To estimate age proﬁles based on administrative
data, some further procedures are used. For

example, in the case of public consumption on education, survey data is used to estimate enrolment
rates by age for immigrants and natives separately.
Even though we were expecting that the access of
immigrants and their children to (particularly
higher) education might be limited, our results
show that enrolment rates of immigrants and natives are rather similar. In Estonia, Sweden and
Belgium, the enrolment rates of immigrants at
young adult ages are even higher than of natives.
The individual public consumption (other than education and health) is mainly estimated using the
EU-SILC data and the collective public consumption
is uniformly distributed. The only component of
public consumption which we cannot allocate to
immigrants and natives separately is public consumption on health. Therefore, the potential differences in public health consumption between both
groups are not captured. However, from survey we
see that the educational levels of people aged 50þ
are rather similar for both immigrants and natives.
Since health condition strongly correlates with education, we expect similar health needs for both
groups. Still, there could be potential differences
regarding the access to those services.
The macroeconomic aggregates calculated from
SNA are available only for the total economy.
Therefore, the obtained age proﬁles for immigrants
and natives are adjusted to match the total age
proﬁles (for immigrants and natives combined). In
this way, the sum of the products between immigration status-speciﬁc per capita age proﬁles and
immigration status-speciﬁc population equals the
value of per capita total age proﬁle multiplied by the
total population. Population data on immigrants
and natives is estimated by using the Census Hub
2011 database (Eurostat, 2015). We take shares of
immigrants and natives from the 2011 census data
and apply them to the 2010 population from our
analysis, taking into account that immigrants and
natives were one year younger in 2010. For example,
the share of immigrants and natives of age x in 2011
is used to estimate the share of immigrants and
natives of age x-1 in 2010.
2.3 Measuring the gap in economic independence
between immigrants and natives
The life cycle deﬁcit as a central category in the
NTA methodology can be used for various economic analyses and indicators. A positive life cycle
deﬁcit is pertinent in the age of childhood and in the
old age. During these periods of life, the labour income falls short of consumption and the deﬁcit
(LCD) is ﬁnanced by private or public transfers or
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by asset income or debt/dissaving. On the contrary,
in a large part of the working age period, an individual experiences negative life cycle deﬁcit e i.e.
positive lifecycle surplus (LCS). Following the NTA
approach, we calculate the start and the end of the
immigrants' and natives’ independency period
(indicating the age span of positive LCS) in the
analysed countries, which represents our ﬁrst
indicator.
However, it is not only important to look at the
length of the economic independence, but also the
size of this independence. Therefore, our second
indicator captures the gap between the immigrants'
and natives’ economic independence level by
measuring the difference in the LCS of immigrants
and natives, relative to the LCS of natives.
LCSI  LCSN
LCS immigration gap ¼
LCSN
Pu
Pu
I
N
x¼l ðYLx  Cx Þ 
x¼l ðYLx  Cx Þ
¼
;
Pu
N
x¼l ðYLx  Cx Þ

ð2Þ

where YL denotes labour income, C consumption;
notation I refers to immigrants and N to natives; l is
age at which independence period starts and u age
at which independence period ends. In order to
eliminate the effects of the different share of immigrants relative to natives across countries, we use
the European standard population (Eurostat, 2013)
for both immigrants and natives. The ‘LCS immigration gap’ indicator measures the relative difference between the LCS of immigrants and natives. It
captures the lower capability of immigrants for
transferring to other age groups and/or generating
savings compared to natives.

3 Results
3.1 Basic information on immigrants in the
analysed countries
Among the EU countries, the required data for the
NTA calculations were available only for the

following ﬁve countries: Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia,
Ireland and Sweden. All except Cyprus are also
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In 2010, their
population varied from 0.8 million in Cyprus to 11.0
million in Belgium, and the unemployment rates
ranged from 6.3% in Cyprus to 16.7% in Estonia (see
Table 1). This indicates large differences among
countries that have also been differently affected by
the crisis. Estonia and Ireland had been more
severely affected at the beginning of the economic
crisis (up to 2010), which in turn had a great impact
on the overall and on the immigrants’ employment
and unemployment rates (OECD, 2016).
The share of immigrants in the total population
ranges from 13.9% in Sweden to 20.0% in Cyprus.
The share of immigrants in the working-age population is higher than the share of immigrants in the
total population. This is a result of the dominant age
interval of immigrant ﬂows being 15e24 years of age
(OECD, 2016) and the size of immigration ﬂows in
the past. The only exception is Estonia, where immigrants are more represented in higher ages
(Eurostat, 2017) and might be related with the
changes in the country border between Estonia and
Russia after World War II.
Since the country of origin is assessed to have an
impact on the employment rates and income outcomes, Fig. 1 presents the composition of immigrants by the continent of origin, for the analysed
countries in 2010. The national composition of immigrants varies considerably across countries and is
mainly a result of former colonial links if any,
former areas of labour recruitment, and ease of
entry from neighbouring countries (Stalker, 2002).
Belgium immigrant segments partly reﬂect the
former colonial links with Africa, but also labour
migrants and refugees from Eastern Europe and
Asia. The latter also holds for Sweden, where
immigration ﬂows are additionally strengthened by
immigrants received on family reuniﬁcation and
humanitarian basis. Cyprus immigrants' structure is

Table 1. Total population, immigrants and unemployment rates in 2010 by country.
Country

Total
population

Immigrants

Immigrants as share
of total pop. (%)

Population
15e64

Immigrants
aged 15e64

Imm
(15e64)/
Pop (15e64)
(%)

Unempl.
rate (%)

Unempl. rate,
immigrants
(%)

Belgium
Cyprus
Estonia
Ireland
Sweden

11,000,638
771,797
1,294,455
4,525,230
9,331,080

1,628,812
154,719
197,364
766,719
1,299,285

14.8
20.0
15.2
16.9
13.9

7,249,774
534,570
864,961
3,022,537
6,045,650

1,290,918
134,164
116,782
636,584
1,023,125

17.8
25.1
13.5
21.1
16.9

6.9
6.3
16.4
13.1
7.1

10.0
N/A
22.8
16.9
16.3

Note: “N/A” stands for “Not Available”.
Sources: Eurostat, 2017; OECD, 2012a; own calculations.

44

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW 2022;24:36e51

100%

80%

Oceania
S.C. America

60%
N.America
Asia

40%

Africa
20%
Europe non EU
Europe EU

0%
Belgium

Cyprus

Estonia

Ireland

Sweden

Fig. 1. Immigrants by continent of origin. Source: OECD (2010 data).

rather a combination of European and Asian immigrants, where the European part is due to colonial
links, as it used to be a British colony, but also
because of the ease of entry for Bulgarians and
Romanians after their EU accession. The Asian part,
however, is a result of the Soviet Union dissolution
and due to the less developed countries nearby.
Rather speciﬁc is Estonia, where the geopolitical
changes led to border shift and now Russia accounts
for 71% of all immigrants. Finally, the immigrants’
structure in Ireland reﬂects the liberal work permit
policy to attract economic migrants for compensation of skill shortage (Mahroum, 2001). The high
economic growth in the period 2000e2007 and the
decision to allow full access to the labour market for
citizens of new member states in 2004 led to a surge
in the number of immigrants in Ireland (Barrett &
Kelly, 2012). A great share of immigrants refers to
recent immigrants coming from high-income OECD
countries and on average being more educated than
across OECD countries.1
Next, there is a greater discrepancy in unemployment rates between natives and immigrants in
Belgium and Sweden. This is in line with our discussion in Section 2 that greater differences are expected when the reason for immigration is not
ﬁnding a job. Namely, in the European Union Labour Force Survey (2008 ad hoc module) only 17%
(Belgium) and 10% (Sweden) of immigrants reported employment as reason for migration. In both
countries, around 58% of immigrants reported
family reuniﬁcation as a motive for immigration
and in Sweden 18% of immigrants reported

humanitarian reasons. On the contrary, in Ireland
unemployment rates of immigrants are not much
higher than of the natives. This is in line with the
survey results where 40% of immigrants reported
employment as a reason for immigration and only
38% family reuniﬁcation (OECD, 2012b). Even
though no data are available for the unemployment
rates of immigrants in Cyprus, one could expect that
they are not drastically different than those of the
natives. That is due to the two main types of immigrants. First are the (British) Cypriots that once
migrated to the UK and other developed countries
in the 1950s and 1960s and have returned back to
Cyprus in the early years of the 21st century
(Teerling, 2011). They had no language proﬁciency
and human capital valuation constraints e thus
excellent prerequisites for employment. The second
type of immigrants are the young workers from
Romania and Bulgaria that entered the country
(after Romania and Bulgaria became the EU members) and other third country nationals occupying
mainly the low paid industries where skill shortage
existed (Christoﬁdes et al., 2009).
3.2 NTA results: labour income, consumption and
economic independency
3.2.1 Labour income
The age proﬁle of labour income has a typical
inverted U-shaped curve. As explained in the methodology part, it reﬂects both 1) the earnings (gross
wages including employers’ social contributions) and
self-employment labour income, as well as 2) the level

1
As of 2012, Ireland has been in 7th place in the OECD in terms of the share of immigrants in its population, where 46% of them arrived in the last 5 years
compared with 22% on average across OECD countries. Immigrants are on average more educated than across OECD countries, and count for 43% of
highly educated compared with 31% across OECD countries, where 66% come from OECD high-income countries (www.oecd.org/migration/integrationindicators-2012/).
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Fig. 2. Labour Income and Consumption age proﬁles for immigrants and natives in the EU countries, 2010. Sources: EU-SILC, 2011; HBS, 2010;
Eurostat database; various other sources and authors' own calculations.

of employment at a certain age. Fig. 2 presents the
labour income age proﬁles for natives and immigrants
in each of the analysed EU countries and also the
average of all ﬁve countries. To make per capita age
proﬁles comparable between countries, we normalise
them with the average labour income of individuals
aged 30e49. This is a commonly used approach in the
NTA framework to eliminate cross-country differences in the level of income, inﬂation rates, exchange
rates, etc. (Lee & Masson, 2011). The age group 30e49
is perceived as a stable denominator, being only in a
small extent affected by different labour market entries and exits across countries. The average labour
income is a simple average of the per capita labour
income for persons of age 30e49.
Fig. 2 shows that the labour income of immigrants
is lower than of the natives at almost all ages in all
countries. Both immigrants and natives start to enter
the labour market at about age 15. Nevertheless, the
labour income of immigrants on average increases
at lower pace and is equal or slightly greater than
that of natives only in certain old ages. That is
mainly due to the difﬁculties entering the labour
market (OECD, 2016), because of lacking country

speciﬁc skills, high number of low-skilled immigrants, wage discrimination of immigrants, lower
negotiating power, accepting low-skill jobs, etc.
In Belgium, Estonia and Sweden, the difference in
labour income between immigrants and natives is
large throughout the entire working age period. The
most striking differences are in Belgium at the age
of 28 and in Estonia at age 26 when immigrants
receive 46% and 40% less income than natives,
respectively. The ﬁnding of lower labour income of
immigrants is in line with the literature that we
presented earlier and the statistical data. Namely, in
Belgium and Sweden the immigrant structure by
type of entry is not labour migration and there are
no skill shortages driven policies in place. Furthermore, the country of origin of those immigrants is
probably at a different level of economic development than the destination country. Also, the destination language knowledge of immigrants is low
and requires long time to learn (except migrants
from former colonies). With regard to Cyprus, there
is also striking difference in the labour income of
both groups, which tends to disappear in the late
working age. Moreover, immigrant labour income
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turns to be greater than of the natives at age 61 and
over. The big difference between immigrants and
natives in Cyprus can be explained by the striking
increase in the immigration ﬂows in the last 15e20
years. The immigrants coming from new EU member states and other third countries nationals are
employed in the low pay industries or are engaged
in domestic work (Gregoriou et al., 2010). In
contrast, the reason for higher labour income of
immigrants than natives in old age is not so clear.
Notwithstanding the relatively loose minimum
required working years, it seems that immigrants
represented at these ages tend to work longer (European Commission, 2018). Finally, immigrants in
Ireland achieve the same age-speciﬁc labour income
as natives at the age of 51 and receive even higher
labour income in some older ages. That corresponds
to the structure of immigrants in Ireland, where
high skilled immigrants from developed countries
prevail. Nevertheless, some puzzles remain unsolved. The results can also be cohort driven, since
Ireland only in 2000s turned to be an immigration
instead of emigration country (OECD, 2012b).
3.2.2 Consumption
The consumption consists of public and private
consumption, each of the categories disaggregated
to 1) education, 2) health and 3) other consumption.
There is a general pattern in all analysed countries
for both immigrants and natives, that the consumption is greater in the young and old ages
compared to the working age, due to the public
education and health services. Private and public
consumption of the working-age population is
relatively stable for both groups of individuals.
However, the level of consumption age proﬁle of
the immigrants for all ﬁve countries strictly differs
from the natives during the working age period. In
that age period, the consumption of immigrants is
lower than the consumption of natives, because of
the lower private consumption other than health
and education, which is expected, given the lower
labour income and therefore fewer resources available. In most of the countries, the inequality between the immigrants' and natives’ consumption is
greater at the beginning of the working age period
(which often corresponds with the ﬁrst years of their
arrival) when immigrants face difﬁculties entering
the labour market (Barigozzi & Speciale, 2011;
Dustmann et al., 2017).
In Belgium and Estonia, the consumption of immigrants is lower than of the natives also during the

2

old age, but this is not the case in other three
countries. In Sweden, the consumption of immigrants and natives is almost the same,2 resulting
from considerably high public consumption. On the
other hand, the private “other consumption” is the
main reason for the higher consumption of immigrants than natives at old ages in Ireland and
Cyprus. This seems to correspond with the higher
asset income of immigrants in the old ages in these
countries, as presented below.
3.2.3 Life cycle surplus and economic independency
By calculating the difference between the presented age proﬁles of labour income and consumption, we derive the age proﬁle of life cycle
surplus (LCS). Table 2 reveals that in all observed
countries, immigrants are self-supported (through
their labour income) for a shorter age span than
natives. The age period of economic independence
for these ﬁve countries combined (unweighted
average) is 30 years for immigrants and 34 years for
natives.
Immigrants in Belgium and Estonia face larger
difference in labour income compared to natives,
which is to a lesser extent offset by lower consumption. In these two countries, immigrants
experience the shortest period of economic independency compared to natives; the labour income of
immigrants becomes greater than their consumption 5 (Belgium) and 2 (Estonia) years later than that
of natives, whereas at higher ages immigrants
become dependent again 2 and 5 years sooner than
natives, respectively. On the other hand, in Cyprus,
Ireland and Sweden the economic independence
period of immigrants is shorter by about 2 years
compared to natives and is a result of the later start
of their economic independence period. This corresponds with the statistical data on high unemployment rates among young who recently
immigrated and their more volatile employment
compared to the immigrants who have been longer
in a country (OECD, 2016).
Furthermore, the ‘LCS immigration gap’ indicator reveals a considerably lower life cycle surplus
of immigrants, expressed as a relative difference in
the size of the economic independence between
immigrants and natives. This difference in LCS
between immigrants and natives relative to LCS
ofnatives also provides meaningful comparisonamong the countries, eliminating country differences in the level of wages, prices, etc. We
argue that this indicator can assess the level of

Note that we were not able to distinguish between public health consumption of immigrants and natives.
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Table 2. Immigrants' and natives’ life cycle independency period and size.
Country

Life cycle independency period (age)

Aggregate life cycle surplus (LCS)

Immigrants

Immigrants (units)

Natives (units)

LCS imm. gap (%)

7985
4655
6142
11,102
14,099

19,238
11,523
14,784
14,402
20,342

58
60
58
23
31

Natives

Start

End

Start

End

Belgium
Cyprus
Estonia
Ireland
Sweden

29
32
27
30
29

57
60
55
60
64

24
30
25
27
27

59
60
60
59
64

Average

29

59

27

60

Integration ranking
1e5
(1-best, 5-worst)
4
5
3
1
2
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Note: Aggregate LCS of immigrants and natives is expressed in units that are result of multiplication of the number of immigrants/
natives in LCS and their LCS (LCS values are standardly normalised with the average labour income of individuals aged 30e49).
Source: EU-SILC, 2011; HBS, 2010; Eurostat database; various other sources and authors' own calculations.

integration of immigrants in a country from the
standpoint of the destination country. The
more the immigrants are self-sustainable either
by achieving reasonable (more similar to natives)
labour outcomes and/or by adjusted consumption,
the lower is the probability of the ﬁscal burden
of immigrants for the destination country. The results show very high difference in the size of
the economic independence between immigrants
and natives in Belgium, Cyprus and Estonia where
the LCS of immigrants is lower by more than 58%
than the LCS of natives. The LCS immigration
gaps for Belgium and Estonia conﬁrm the results of
the previous indicator that revealed the biggest
difference in the length of the independence
period between immigrants and natives in these
two countries out of all analysed countries.
Conversely, the LCS immigration gap for Cyprus is
the largest, placing this country at the worst place
in our ranking for integration, despite the relatively small difference in the independency span
between immigrants and natives. Nevertheless, the
given rank is in line with the Mipex3 ranking scale
and reﬂects the inexistence or the very limited
integration policies and bad conditions for the
majority of immigrants in Cyprus (Trimikliniotis &
Demetriou, 2011). The relative difference in the
size of the economic independence between immigrants and natives is the smallest in Ireland,
followed by Sweden, where the LCS immigration
gap is 23% and 31% (lower LCS of immigrants
relative to LCS of natives), respectively. That seems
to correspond to the rather narrow gap of the
economic independency span of approximately
two years.

3.3 Financing the LCD at older ages
The developed countries face a rapid population
ageing that will be even more pronounced in the
following decades. The researchers, international
institutions and policy makers are concerned with
the impact of population ageing on the sustainability of the public systems, especially pensions, health
care and long-term care. However, the impact on
the public sustainability depends on the manner
how the LCD of the elderly is ﬁnanced. For example,
pay-as-you-go pensions systems will be heavily
inﬂuenced by population ageing, whereas the
impact on the funded systems (where each individual saves for his/her own pension) will be much
lower.
Financing the old-age deﬁcit varies strongly
across the countries. Interesting regional differences
have been identiﬁed worldwide reﬂecting the
different arrangement of the support systems.
Europe is characterized as a region where the most
important role in old-age economic dependency
ﬁnancing play the public transfers (Mason & Lee,
2011). Following the approach of Mason and Lee
(2011), Fig. 3 presents the ‘triangle graph’ with three
channels through which elderly (65 years and older)
ﬁnance their LCD: public transfers, private transfers
and asset-based reallocations. In particular, each
side of the triangle represents reliance on one of
those three sources. By deﬁnition, for each spot in
the triangle (or outside the triangle) the components
sum up to 100%. We present the results separately
for immigrants and natives.
All observed countries, both for immigrants and
natives, are located near the right-hand side of the
triangle, which means they are mainly relying on

3
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) uses a number of indicators, including labour market integration, long-term residence and family reuniﬁcation rights, political rights, access to nationality, anti-discrimination policies and public opinion. Cyprus has the lowest score out of the analysed countries
in this paper.

48

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW 2022;24:36e51

Fig. 3. Life cycle deﬁcit ﬁnancing in old age (65þ) for immigrants and natives in 2010. Source: EU-SILC, 2011; HBS, 2010; Eurostat database; various
other sources and authors' own calculations. Note: BE ¼ Belgium, CY¼ Cyprus, EE ¼ Estonia, IE¼ Ireland, SE¼ Sweden.

some combination of assets and public transfers and
to a very limited extent on private family transfers.
In Belgium and Estonia, public transfers are
important for the natives, but they are even more
important for the immigrants. In Cyprus, Ireland
and Sweden, the asset-based reallocations are very
important for immigrants. Despite the minor
contribution of the private transfers in ﬁnancing the
LCD, in most of the countries, slightly greater reliance on these transfers by immigrants can be
observed. This is in line with the ﬁndings that
overall familial support is more exchanged in
immigrant families (Kim et al., 2012), due to the
stronger intergenerational bond in these families, as
opposed to the majority of the population across
Europe (Bordone & de Valk, 2016).
Considering the very low life cycle surplus of immigrants in Belgium and Estonia that cannot provide
conditions for savings, it is expected that immigrants
in the old age rely more on public transfers than
natives. Immigrants’ asset income in the old age is
substantially greater than that of natives in Ireland,
Cyprus and Sweden. A further analysis of the asset
income components reveals that the difference
originates from the greater value of capital income of
immigrants. Consequently, the immigrants in these
countries are less dependent on public transfers, and
if we exclude Ireland and Cyprus (due to the previously mentioned rich cohorts), our data reveal that
immigrants tend to save and invest more than natives in the period of life cycle surplus and rely more

on their own ﬁnances than natives in the period of
old age (case of Sweden).

4 Discussion and conclusions
By applying the National Transfer Accounts
(NTA) methodology, we estimate average labour
income and consumption by age for both natives
and immigrants. We use the latest available and
comparable data to identify how the production,
consumption and economic ﬂows across age differ
for immigrants and natives.
The novelty of the NTA approach is in providing
the age distribution of labour income and consumption, which enables new research possibilities.
As a result, we can analyse at which age individuals
face life cycle deﬁcit and how long they are
economically independent, i.e. earn more than they
consume. Moreover, this methodology enables an
analysis of how children and elderly ﬁnance the gap
between consumption and labour income through
public transfers, private transfers and asset-based
reallocations. In this study, we present, for the ﬁrst
time, the NTA results separately for immigrants and
natives. Due to heavy data requirements, this has
been possible only for Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia,
Ireland and Sweden.
The results show that in all countries and almost
at all ages the labour income of immigrants is lower
than of natives. Both immigrants and natives start to
enter the labour market at the same age, but the
labour income of immigrants increases at lower
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pace and never reaches the maximum level of natives. This is in line with the previous studies on
slow labour market integration in the ﬁrst years of
residence in the destination country and lower incomes of immigrants, especially in the ﬁrst years of
employment.
Regarding consumption, the results for immigrants primarily suggest that private consumption
(other than health and education) is the main
adjustment vehicle to compensate for the lower labour income in the working age. In general, the
results for the age-speciﬁc consumption are an
important contribution to the limited literature for
the consumption of immigrants. Nevertheless, the
same or higher consumption of immigrants in few
of the countries in the old age (Sweden, Ireland and
Cyprus) should be subject to further research. Using
the NTA methodology, we were able to allocate to
immigrants and natives all categories of public
consumption except public consumption on health.
Given the data limitation, we assumed the same per
capita public consumption on health for both immigrants and natives. However, the needs and access to public health consumption might differ,
which is left for the future research.
Due to the lower labour income which is not offset
by lower consumption, immigrants experience
shorter age span of LCS (economic independence
period) and much lower aggregate LCS than natives.
In Cyprus, Ireland and Sweden, the shorter economic
independence period of immigrants of around 2 years
is mainly a result of the later start of their economic
independence period. In contrast, in Belgium and
Estonia the shorter age span of LCS of immigrants
compared to natives is a result of both later start and
earlier end of their independence period, representing
greater differences between these two types of residents. Also, we introduced an indicator that captures
the relative difference between immigrants' and natives' economic independence level by measuring the
ratio of the difference between LCS of immigrants and
natives relative to LCS of natives. The so-called ‘LCS
immigration gap’ reveals a very high difference in the
size of the economic independence between immigrants and natives. The LCS of immigrants is lower
than the LCS of natives by 58%e60% in Belgium,
Cyprus and Estonia, 23% in Ireland and 31% in Sweden. We argue that this indicator along with the length
of the immigrants' independency period can serve as a
proxy for the level of integration of immigrants from
the standpoint of the destination country and can offer
a tool for comparison across countries. Furthermore,
monitoring these two indicators in a country over time
can signal policy makers how (un)successful the newly
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implemented changes are in the measures and policies for the integration of immigrants.
Finally, based on the obtained results we focus on
how the life cycle deﬁcit in the older age is ﬁnanced.
Although the elderly in the analysed countries
generally rely on public transfers, in Cyprus, Ireland
and Sweden, immigrants tend to ﬁnance the deﬁcit
more extensively through the asset-based reallocations than natives who rely much more on the
public transfers. While in Cyprus and Ireland this
difference might refer to speciﬁc cohort characteristics, in Sweden it suggests that immigrants tend to
save and invest more than natives.
The EU countries, especially those with a constant
ﬂow of immigrants, shall continue with measures for
labour market integration along with the continuous
assessment of their integration policies effectiveness.
Our results show that higher labour income provides
longer and greater life cycle surplus, and in turn
provides higher level of consumption, which is an
important determinant of the individual's well-being.
Further research shall be focused on the saving and
investing behaviour of immigrants, as this study
suggest that this behaviour (apparent in the late
working age and old age) might partly offset the
negative implications of the labour income gap. Both
higher labour income of immigrants and their
greater reliance on asset-based reallocations would
reduce the ﬁscal pressure of population ageing on
young and future generations.
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